On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
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Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002
Publication InfoMcAdams, David (2007). On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1). pp. 729-732. 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944.
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Professor of Business Administration
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked a