On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
Abstract
Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or
bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price
auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In
particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders
bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002Publication Info
(2007). On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1). pp. 729-732. 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1944.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Show full item recordScholars@Duke
David McAdams
Professor of Business Administration
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business,
Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at
Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics
from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School
of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied
Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked a
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