On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation
Abstract
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity
to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs
occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists
of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum
of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes.
A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the
one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set.
Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier
Inc. All rights reserved.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1946Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005Publication Info
(2005). On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 120(1). pp. 73-107. 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1946.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Huseyin Yildirim
Professor of Economics
Professor Yildirim joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving a Ph.D. from the
University of Florida. He is an applied microeconomic theorist with broad interests.
He has written on such varied topics as dynamic procurement auctions, charitable fundraising,
committee design, and, most recently, career concerns in teamwork and tournaments.
His work has appeared in top economics journals, including American Economic Review,
Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND J
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