On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation
Repository Usage Stats
We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005
Publication InfoRomano, R; & Yildirim, H (2005). On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation. Journal of Economic Theory, 120(1). pp. 73-107. 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1946.
This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
More InfoShow full item record
Professor of Economics
Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.