| dc.description.abstract |
05 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice
mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices
facing parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston
mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and the case in favor of the change to a
strategy-proof mechanism. Using detailed records on student choices and assignments,
we present evidence both of sophisticated strategic behavior among some parents, and
of unsophisticated strategic behavior by others. We find evidence that some parents
pay close attention to the capacity constraints of different schools, while others
appear not to. In particular, we show that many unassigned students could have been
assigned to one of their stated choices with a different strategy under the current
mechanism. This interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players identifies
a new rationale for strategy-proof mechanisms based on fairness, and was a critical
argument in Boston's decision to change the mechanism. We then discuss the considerations
that led to the adoption of a deferred acceptance mechanism as opposed to the (also
strategy-proof) top trading cycles mechanism.
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