Show simple item record Chami, Ralph en_US Fullenkamp, Connel en_US 2010-03-09T15:42:26Z 2010-03-09T15:42:26Z 2002 en_US
dc.description.abstract Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. Finally, we show how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools. en_US
dc.format.extent 7235003 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher SSRN eLibrary en_US
dc.title Trust as a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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