Show simple item record

Trust as a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency

dc.contributor.author Chami, Ralph
dc.contributor.author Fullenkamp, Connel
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:42:26Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:42:26Z
dc.date.issued 2002
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/2044
dc.description.abstract Agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency. We propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems: increased monitoring and incentive-based pay. We show how trust induces employees to work harder, relative to those at firms that use the standard tools. In addition, we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction, and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits. Finally, we show how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency-mitigation tools.
dc.format.extent 7235003 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher SSRN eLibrary
dc.title Trust as a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency
dc.type Journal article


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record