Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
Abstract
form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after
receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable
supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below
the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known
that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the
Walrasian price.
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David McAdams
Professor of Business Administration
David McAdams is Professor of Business Administration at the Fuqua School of Business,
Duke University. He is also Professor of Economics in the Economics Department at
Duke. He earned a B.S. in Applied Mathematics at Harvard University, an M.S. in Statistics
from Stanford University, and a Ph.D. in Business from the Stanford Graduate School
of Business. Before joining the faculty at Duke, he was Associate Professor of Applied
Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He has also worked a
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