Show simple item record McAdams, Prof David en_US 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z 2006 en_US
dc.description.abstract form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the Walrasian price. en_US
dc.format.extent 239352 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher SSRN eLibrary en_US
dc.title Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.department Economics

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