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Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply

dc.contributor.author McAdams, David
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z
dc.date.issued 2006
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2069
dc.description.abstract form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the Walrasian price.
dc.format.extent 239352 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher SSRN eLibrary
dc.title Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
dc.type Journal article


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