Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply
dc.contributor.author | McAdams, David | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-09T15:43:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2069 | |
dc.description.abstract | form-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the Walrasian price. | |
dc.format.extent | 239352 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | SSRN eLibrary | |
dc.title | Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply | |
dc.type | Journal article |
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