School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abstract
A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism.
Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does
not offer specific mechanisms. The flaws in the existing school choice plans result
in appeals by unsatisfied parents. We formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism
design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those
in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle. We show that these existing plans have
serious shortcomings, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide
a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Type
Journal articlePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2090Published Version (Please cite this version)
jstor.org/stable/3132114
Citation
Abdulkadiroglu, A., & Sonmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach.
American Economic Review, 93(3), 729-747. jstor.org/stable/3132114
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