Show simple item record

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand

dc.contributor.author Lewis, TR
dc.contributor.author Sappington, D
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-09T15:44:21Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-09T15:44:21Z
dc.date.issued 1988
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2092
dc.description.abstract Optimal regulatory policy is derived in a setting where the firm has better knowledge of demand than the regulator. When marginal production costs increase with output, the regulator can induce the firm to use its private information entirely in the social interest. When marginal costs decline with output, however, the regulator is unable to derive any benefit from the firm's superior knowledge, and a single price is established that is invariant to demand.
dc.format.extent 878190 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.subject monopolist
dc.subject regulation
dc.subject unknown demand
dc.title Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand
dc.type Journal article
duke.contributor.id Lewis, TR|0288071


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record