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“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

dc.contributor.author Collard-Wexler, A
dc.contributor.author Gowrisankaran, G
dc.contributor.author Lee, RS
dc.date.accessioned 2020-10-14T13:53:51Z
dc.date.available 2020-10-14T13:53:51Z
dc.date.issued 2019-02-01
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/21600
dc.description.abstract © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends Rubinstein’s alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms’ marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair’s Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1086/700729
dc.subject C78
dc.subject D43
dc.subject L13
dc.title “Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work
dc.type Scholarly edition
duke.contributor.id Collard-Wexler, A|0659668
dc.date.updated 2020-10-14T13:53:51Z
pubs.begin-page 163
pubs.end-page 195
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.organisational-group Economics
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.publication-status Published


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