Partisan Preemption: the Strategic use of Federal Preemption Legislation
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Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1093/publius/pjw005
Publication InfoSoRelle, Mallory E; & Walker, Alexis N (2016). Partisan Preemption: the Strategic use of Federal Preemption Legislation. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 46(4). pp. 486-509. 10.1093/publius/pjw005. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/21708.
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Assistant Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy
Mallory SoRelle is an Assistant Professor at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. Her research and teaching explore how public policies are produced by, and critically how they reproduce, socioeconomic and political inequality in the United States. She focuses primarily on issues like consumer financial protection and access to civil justice that fundamentally shape the welfare of marginalized communities yet are often overlooked by scholars of the welfare state because they a