Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
Abstract
An uninformed principal appoints a committee of experts to vote on a multi-attribute
alternative, such as an interdisciplinary project. Each expert evaluates one attribute
and is biased toward it (specialty bias). The principal values all attributes equally
but has a status quo bias, reflecting the organizational cost of a change. We study
whether the principal would compose the committee of more or less specialty-biased
experts. We show that her optimal composition is nonmonotonic in the majority rule,
with the most biased experts appointed under intermediate rules. We then show that
the principal would be less concerned about the committee composition if its members
can be uninformed, as they induce the informed to vote less strategically. Surprisingly,
although uninformed members lower the quality of the committee's decision, the principal
may prefer to have some when its composition is suboptimal, and the majority rule
is sufficiently extreme, such as the unanimity.
Type
Journal articlePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/24279Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010Publication Info
Name Correa, AJ; & Yildirim, H (2021). Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee. Games and Economic Behavior, 127(268). pp. 1-27. 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.010. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/24279.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
Collections
More Info
Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Huseyin Yildirim
Professor of Economics
Professor Yildirim joined Duke Economics in 2000 after receiving a Ph.D. from the
University of Florida. He is an applied microeconomic theorist with broad interests.
He has written on such varied topics as dynamic procurement auctions, charitable fundraising,
committee design, and, most recently, career concerns in teamwork and tournaments.
His work has appeared in top economics journals, including American Economic Review,
Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND J

Articles written by Duke faculty are made available through the campus open access policy. For more information see: Duke Open Access Policy
Rights for Collection: Scholarly Articles
Works are deposited here by their authors, and represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials and descriptions may include offensive content. More info