Essays in Microeconomic Theory
This dissertation consists of three main chapters - chapter 2, 3, and 4. These are different research problems studying the use of information. In chapter 2, we study a mechanism design problem where the Principal hires two agents to inspect a product, the quality of which is uncertain. The main research question we ask is the comparison of the inspection protocols. We found the optimality of sequential inspection among the protocols considered. We then extend the analysis to allow agents to differ and try to understand which is the better to order the agents when using the sequential protocol. In chapter 3, we study an information design problem where a present biased agent could commit to an information choice to help herself to save more that she would have. We provide a full characterization of the optimal information choice for a risk averse present biased agent. After that, as an effort to further understand the interaction between risk aversion and present bias, we introduce the EZKP framework and find a counterexample where risk aversion itself has no impact on the form of the information choice in a special case where the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution is fixed. In chapter 4, we study an information design in games problem where a designer chooses information for the agents to induce joint effort. We provide two examples illustrating the relative strength of two prominent constructions of the optimal information structure in the literature.
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