Renegotiation and Specific Performance
Abstract
This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted
breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier
receives relevant private information, renegotiation does not always occur even though
gains from trade exist. Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specifice
performance and result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately
defined, relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are permitted.
Type
Journal articlePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2647Collections
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Tracy R. Lewis
Walter M. Upchurch, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
Tracy Lewis is Professor of Economics at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University,
where he holds the Black Chair in Economics. Professor Lewis founded the Innovation
Center at the University. Prior to joining the Duke University Faculty in 2003, he
served on the faculties at the University of Florida, at the California Institute
of Technology, the University of British Columbia, and the University of California,
Davis. Aside from academic employment, he has also held positions at the Fed
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