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Renegotiation and Specific Performance

dc.contributor.author Lewis, TR
dc.contributor.author Sappington, D
dc.contributor.author Perry, M
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-28T19:40:28Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-28T19:40:28Z
dc.date.issued 1989
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/2647
dc.description.abstract This article will examine the implications of enforcing specific performance for attempted breach of contract in a model of renegotiation. It will be shown that after the supplier receives relevant private information, renegotiation does not always occur even though gains from trade exist. Further, this article will argue that enforcement of specifice performance and result in a higher level of expected social welfare, appropriately defined, relative to the case where monetary damages for breach of contract are permitted.
dc.format.extent 1165142 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.subject renegotiation
dc.subject specific performance
dc.title Renegotiation and Specific Performance
dc.type Journal article
duke.contributor.id Lewis, TR|0288071


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