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    • A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise 

      Ambrus, Attila; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-09-17)
      We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being ...
    • Supplementary Appendix to 'A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise' 

      Ambrus, Attila; Baranovskyi, V; Kolb, A (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-09-17)
      This supplement provides welfare results not contained in the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a downward equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large ...