Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • A Note on Moral Hazard and Linear Compensation Schemes 

      Wang, XY (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2013-07-18)
      This note identifies a moral hazard environment in which a piecewise linear compensation scheme is optimal. Both the principal and the agent have CARA utility, mean output is increasing in the agent's non-contractible input, ...
    • Interdependent Utility and Truthtelling in Two-Sided Matching 

      Wang, XY (Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2013-07-18)
      Mechanisms which implement stable matchings are often observed to work well in practice, even in environments where the stable outcome is not unique, information is complete, and the number of players is small. Why might ...