This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where ...

This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, get aggregated into a group decision in two contexts: reciprocating gifts, and choosing between lotteries. In both contexts ...

We experimentally study the impact of adding an explicit nil vote option to the ballot in both compulsory and voluntary voting settings. We investigate this issue in an informational voting setting, in which some voters ...

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in ...

This Supplementary Appendix contains the English translations of the experimental questionnaire, survey questions, and instructions that were used in our experimental sessions on June 9th and 10th of 2010. For the original ...

This paper studies the formation of risk-sharing networks through costly social investments. First, individuals invest in relationships to form a network. Next, neighboring agents negotiate risk-sharing arrangements, in ...

This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many di fferent equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria ...

Using data on roll calls from the U.S. House of Representatives, this paper finds empirical support for informational theories of legislative decision-making. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, the bias of the committee ...

Withdrawal penalties are common features of time deposit contracts offered by commercial banks, as well as individual retirement accounts and employer-sponsored plans. Moreover, there is a significant amount of early withdrawals ...

In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, ...