Now showing items 11-16 of 16
Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2012-03-01)
Withdrawal penalties are common features of time deposit contracts offered by commercial banks, as well as individual retirement accounts and employer-sponsored plans. Moreover, there is a significant amount of early withdrawals ...
Supplement to 'Compensated Discount Functions: An Experiment on the Influence of Expected Income on Time Preferences'
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, 2015-03-01)
This Supplementary Appendix contains the English translations of the experimental questionnaire, survey questions, and instructions that were used in our experimental sessions on June 9th and 10th of 2010. For the original ...
Democratic Punishment in Public Good Games with Perfect and Imperfect Observability
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-08-26)
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, ...
Supplementary Appendix to 'Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives'
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-12-04)
Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."
Gradual Bidding in Ebay-Like Auctions
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2013-09-05)
This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many di fferent equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria ...
On Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination
(Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID), 2015-03-23)
This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary ...