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<p>I argue that ethical convictions are crucial to the maintenance and transformation
of social institutions. Moreover, since ethical convictions are sometimes corrigible
and open to persuasive transformation, ethical persuasion can be a powerful source
of social change. However, I observe that the dominant analytic techniques of the
social sciences are ill equipped to understand the nature and import of ethical convictions,
and even less well equipped to inform ethical persuasion. I argue this, in part, explains
why social science research has often proved of little value in trying to address
prominent social concerns.</p><p>This diagnosis raises a puzzle and a challenge. The
puzzle is why some social scientists would wholly commit themselves to methods that
cannot adequately deal with important dimensions of social structure. I show this
is due to a misguided conception of science, one which seeks an "absolute perspective"
that requires reducing or explaining away ethical convictions.</p><p>The challenge,
once this vision of science is rejected in favor of a more pragmatic one, is 1) to
understand the systematic limits of different methodological approaches and 2) to
see how an account of ethics, rightly understood, can complement social scientific
knowledge in service of better social outcomes. </p><p>I evaluate three dominant
methodological approaches in the social sciences, namely, statistical modeling, formal
modeling, and biological-behavioral research. Although all are useful within certain
domains, I show that each has systematic limits relating to the dynamism of ethical
convictions. I demonstrate how these methods can fail on their own terms and can blind
researchers to important resources for social change, such as possibilities for persuasion.</p><p></p><p>Finally,
I develop an account of the relationship between ethics, rationality, and persuasion
drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor.
This account rejects prominent "scientific" attempts to explain ethical allegiances
as biologically hardwired or structurally determined, and it further challenges accounts
of ethical naturalism and pluralistic neutrality. </p><p>I conclude by illustrating
the constructive role that ethical persuasion has played in a number of development
projects, which help demonstrate my thesis that debates about visions of "the good"
matter profoundly for human flourishing.</p>
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