Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
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The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school-single tiebreaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21).
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
Publication InfoAbdulkadiroǧlu, A; Pathak, PA; & Roth, AE (2009). Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. American Economic Review, 99(5). pp. 1954-1978. 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/3354.
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