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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

dc.contributor.author Abdulkadiroǧlu, A
dc.contributor.author Pathak, PA
dc.contributor.author Roth, AE
dc.date.accessioned 2011-04-15T16:46:16Z
dc.date.issued 2009-12-01
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10161/3354
dc.description.abstract The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school-single tiebreaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21).
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher American Economic Association
dc.relation.ispartof American Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
dc.title Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
dc.type Journal article
dc.description.version Version of Record
duke.date.pubdate 2009-12-0
duke.description.issue 5
duke.description.volume 99
dc.relation.journal American Economic Review
pubs.begin-page 1954
pubs.end-page 1978
pubs.issue 5
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Economics
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 99


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