| dc.contributor.author |
Hocutt, Max |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-03-25T20:42:36Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-03-25T20:42:36Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2009 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/3390 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
ABSTRACT: In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges
B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary
ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal
contributions to a naturalistic understanding of ethical choice and language.
|
|
| dc.publisher |
Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies |
|
| dc.subject |
naturalistic fallacy, ethical naturalism, pragmatism, evolutionary ethics, genetic
fallacy, value
|
|
| dc.title |
NATURALIST MORAL THEORY: A REPLY TO STADDON |
|
| dc.type |
Journal article |
|
