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<p>How do political leaders strategically manage fiscal policy formation to enhance
their political survival? What are the implications of the fiscal mechanics of survival
for theories of redistribution and democratic transition? This dissertation examines
the complex relationship between political regime types and fiscal information asymmetries.
I focus on budgetary policies (taxation and public spending) as major strategic tools
available to the executive for co-optation and punishment of opponents. I argue that
allowing some degree of contestation and transparency on the fiscal contract in electoral
authoritarian regimes helps the executive identify distributive claims and co-opt
the opposition. Paradoxically, in new democracies, political survival depends more
on lower levels of budget transparency than existent theories would have us expect.
Chapters 1 and 2 present a general formal model from which I derive the major hypotheses
of the study. Second, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use new cross-national measures of fiscal
transparency and test empirically the theoretical implications. The statistical models
confirm the main theoretical intuitions. Finally, Chapter 6 compares in greater detail
the evolution of fiscal transparency in Morocco, Turkey and Romania between 1950 and
2000. I argue that fiscal taboos closely followed the shifting political alliance
and their distributional consequences for leader's survival.</p>
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