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Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information

dc.contributor.advisor Belloni, Alexandre
dc.contributor.advisor Lopomo, Giuseppe Wang, Shouqiang 2012-05-29T16:41:21Z 2012-05-29T16:41:21Z 2011
dc.description.abstract <p>This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.</p>
dc.subject Business
dc.title Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information
dc.type Dissertation
dc.department Business Administration

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