Institutional designs of customary fisheries management arrangements in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Mexico
Abstract
There are considerable efforts by governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and academia to integrate marine conservation initiatives and customary practices,
such as taboos that limit resource use. However, these efforts are often pursued without
a fundamental understanding of customary institutions. This paper examines the operational
rules in use and the presence of institutional design principles in long-enduring
and dynamic customary fisheries management institutions in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia,
and Mexico. Rather than a "blue print" for devising long-enduring institutions, this
study relies on the design principles as a starting point to organize an inquiry into
the institutional diversity found in customary governance regimes. Three important
trends emerged from this comparative analysis: (1) despite it being notoriously difficult
to define boundaries around marine resources, almost 3/4 of the cases in this study
had clearly defined boundaries and membership; (2) all of the customary institutions
were able to make and change rules, indicating a critical degree of flexibility and
autonomy that may be necessary for adaptive management; (3) the customary institutions
examined generally lacked key interactions with organizations operating at larger
scales, suggesting that they may lack the institutional embeddedness required to confront
some common pool resources (CPR) challenges from the broader socioeconomic, institutional
and political settings in which they are embedded. Future research will be necessary
to better understand how specific institutional designs are related to social and
ecological outcomes in commons property institutions. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
Type
Journal articlePermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6453Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1016/j.marpol.2011.06.005Publication Info
Cinner, JE; Basurto, X; Fidelman, P; Kuange, J; Lahari, R; & Mukminin, A (2012). Institutional designs of customary fisheries management arrangements in Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea, and Mexico. Marine Policy, 36(1). pp. 278-285. 10.1016/j.marpol.2011.06.005. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6453.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
Collections
More Info
Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Xavier Basurto
Truman and Nellie Semans/Alex Brown & Sons Associate Professor
I am interested in the fundamental question of how groups (human and non-human) can
find ways to self-organize, cooperate, and engage in successful collective action
for the benefit of the common good. To do this I strive to understand how the institutions
(formal and informal rules and norms) that govern social behavior, interplay with
biophysical variables to shape social-ecological systems. What kind of institutions
are better able to govern complex-adaptive systems? and how can societies (la

Articles written by Duke faculty are made available through the campus open access policy. For more information see: Duke Open Access Policy
Rights for Collection: Scholarly Articles
Works are deposited here by their authors, and represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials and descriptions may include offensive content. More info