Generic competition and market exclusivity periods in pharmaceuticals
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In this paper we examine generic competition and market exclusivity periods for pharmaceuticals experiencing their initial generic entry between 1995 and 2005. We find that generic competition has increased over several dimensions. First, an increasing number of drugs are subject to generic entry, including drugs with relatively modest annual average sales. Second, drugs with larger sales attract more generic entrants and have shorter market exclusivity periods than smaller selling drugs. Third, blockbuster drugs with annual sales in excess of $1 billion have experienced significant decreases in their market exclusivity periods in recent years. We also find that Hatch-Waxman Act patent challenges have negatively affected market exclusivity periods over the 1995 to 2005 period. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Published Version (Please cite this version)10.1002/mde.1356
Publication InfoGrabowski, HG; & Kyle, M (2007). Generic competition and market exclusivity periods in pharmaceuticals. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(4-5). pp. 491-502. 10.1002/mde.1356. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6727.
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Professor Emeritus of Economics
Professor Grabowski specializes in the investigation of economics in the pharmaceutical industry, government regulation of business, and the economics of innovation. His specific interests within these fields include intellectual property and generic competition issues, the effects of government policy actions, and the costs and returns to pharmaceutical R&D. He has been publishing research papers for over four decades, from his earlier work, “The Effects of Regulatory Policy on the Incentives