Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics
Abstract
Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery
claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge
or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in
the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning,
and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have
been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine
abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar
structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining
the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers,
who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral
concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson's
experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally,
I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure
as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular
moral concepts conclusion. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6984Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1007/s12152-011-9106-8Publication Info
Park, JJ (2013). Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics. Neuroethics, 6(2). pp. 237-247. 10.1007/s12152-011-9106-8. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6984.This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this
article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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