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International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional design discretion sweetens the pot

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Date
2014-01-01
Authors
Johnson, TANA
Urpelainen, J
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Abstract
Bureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess limited discretion in institutional design; sometimes, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states' design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, because of states' need for bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent model, case studies, and an original data set. © 2014 by The IO Foundation.
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Journal article
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6991
Published Version (Please cite this version)
10.1017/S0020818313000349
Publication Info
Johnson, TANA; & Urpelainen, J (2014). International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional design discretion sweetens the pot. International Organization, 68(1). pp. 177-209. 10.1017/S0020818313000349. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6991.
This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.
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Scholars@Duke

Johnson

Tana L. Johnson

Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy
(On leave during 2019-2020)Tana Johnson (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is a political scientist working in the field of international relations and international/global policy.  Her work is driven by big puzzles in international relations and by important problems in the real world.  In global affairs, what makes delegation and institutional design so challenging?  Why do nation-states delegate to international institutions in spite of the challenges?  And how c
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