dc.contributor.author |
Johnson, TANA |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Urpelainen, J |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-05-01T18:29:21Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2014-01-01 |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
0020-8183 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/6991 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
Bureaucrats working in international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) regularly
help states design new IGOs. Sometimes international bureaucrats possess limited discretion
in institutional design; sometimes, they enjoy broad discretion. In fact, they gain
discretion even when they openly oppose state preferences. This contravenes conventional
thinking about delegation: discretion should decrease as preference divergence between
states and international bureaucrats increases. We develop a principal-agent theory
of how much discretion states grant to international bureaucrats in the design of
new IGOs. This is novel: while principal-agent theories of international delegation
are common, scholars have not analyzed principal-agent relationships in the creation
of new IGOs. We argue that even an international bureaucracy that disagrees with states'
design preferences may enjoy substantial design leeway, because of states' need for
bureaucratic expertise. In developing this argument, we employ a formal principal-agent
model, case studies, and an original data set. © 2014 by The IO Foundation.
|
|
dc.publisher |
Cambridge University Press (CUP) |
|
dc.relation.ispartof |
International Organization |
|
dc.relation.isversionof |
10.1017/S0020818313000349 |
|
dc.title |
International bureaucrats and the formation of intergovernmental organizations: Institutional
design discretion sweetens the pot
|
|
dc.type |
Journal article |
|
duke.contributor.id |
Johnson, TANA|0548013 |
|
pubs.begin-page |
177 |
|
pubs.end-page |
209 |
|
pubs.issue |
1 |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Duke |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Political Science |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Sanford School of Public Policy |
|
pubs.organisational-group |
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences |
|
pubs.publication-status |
Published |
|
pubs.volume |
68 |
|
dc.identifier.eissn |
1531-5088 |
|