Abstract
This book provides an insightful view of major issues in the economics of corporate
governance (CG) and mergers. It presents a systematic update on the developments in
the two fields during the last decade, as well as highlighting the neglected topics
in CG research, such as the role of boards, CG and public interest and the relation
of CG to mergers. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this book: the first
is that corporate governance systems that better align shareholders and managers interests
lead to better corporate performance; second, there is an important relationship between
CG structures and the quality of firm decision-making, one of the most important being
the decision to merge or take over another firm. Focusing on some of the often-neglected
aspects of corporate governance such as non-profit organizations and public interest,
as well as mergers and acquisitions from a CG perspective, this book will be a valuable
resource for both academics and postgraduate students of finance, business and economics.
Material is made available in this collection at the direction of authors according
to their understanding of their rights in that material. You may download and use
these materials in any manner not prohibited by copyright or other applicable law.
Rights for Collection: Research and Writings
Works are deposited here by their authors, and
represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials
and descriptions may include offensive content.
More info