Personal identity and practical reason: The failure of Kantian replies to Parfit
Abstract
This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt
in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality
and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he
forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian
thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still
have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what
to do. The argument between Parfit and his opponents illuminates broader questions
about the relationship between our metaphysical beliefs and our practical reasons.
© 2008 Canadian Philosophical Association.
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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/8373Collections
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Show full item recordScholars@Duke
Jonathan Anomaly
Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science
I work mostly on issues at the intersection of ethics and economics, including how
we should respond to the under-consumption of vaccines and the over-consumption of
antibiotics, and whether the market for biomedical enhancements should be regulated
in any way. More generally, my research focuses on collective action problems. I
recently co-edited the first major <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-politics-and-economics-9780190207311?cc=us&lang=en&a
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