Institutional Shifts and Distorted Intelligence: Examining the 1953 Coup Against Mohammad Mossadegh
Abstract
This paper examines the role of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the coup against Iran’s democratically elected Prime
Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. Specifically, this paper argues that an expansion
and redefinition of the NSC under Eisenhower ultimately led the CIA to overthrow Mossadegh,
thus shifting the U.S. Intelligence Community from a primary focus on analysis to
a prioritization of operations. To support this claim, this paper discusses major
turning points in the development and growth of the NSC and CIA within the context
of the Cold War. Furthermore, by looking at the history of oil exploitation in Iran,
this paper connects the expansion of the NSC and CIA to a distortion and misinterpretation
of facts surrounding Iranian oil nationalization, which further stoked fears of Soviet
expansion and encouraged an operational response by the United States.
Type
Master's thesisDepartment
Graduate Liberal StudiesPermalink
https://hdl.handle.net/10161/9232Citation
Bonin, Tyler (2014). Institutional Shifts and Distorted Intelligence: Examining the 1953 Coup Against
Mohammad Mossadegh. Master's thesis, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/9232.Collections
More Info
Show full item record
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Rights for Collection: Graduate Liberal Studies
Works are deposited here by their authors, and represent their research and opinions, not that of Duke University. Some materials and descriptions may include offensive content. More info