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The dynamic efficiency costs of common-pool resource exploitation

dc.contributor.author Huang, L
dc.contributor.author Smith, Martin D
dc.date.accessioned 2014-12-09T15:16:02Z
dc.date.issued 2014-01-01
dc.identifier.issn 0002-8282
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9293
dc.description.abstract We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies.
dc.relation.ispartof American Economic Review
dc.relation.isversionof 10.1257/aer.104.12.4071
dc.title The dynamic efficiency costs of common-pool resource exploitation
dc.type Journal article
pubs.begin-page 3991
pubs.end-page 4026
pubs.issue 12
pubs.organisational-group Duke
pubs.organisational-group Duke Science & Society
pubs.organisational-group Economics
pubs.organisational-group Environmental Sciences and Policy
pubs.organisational-group Initiatives
pubs.organisational-group Institutes and Provost's Academic Units
pubs.organisational-group Nicholas School of the Environment
pubs.organisational-group Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
pubs.publication-status Published
pubs.volume 104


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