Skip to main content
Duke University Libraries
View Item 
  •   DukeSpace
  • Theses and Dissertations
  • Duke Dissertations
  • View Item
  •   DukeSpace
  • Theses and Dissertations
  • Duke Dissertations
  • View Item
    • Login
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Irresistible Reasons, Immovable Minds, and the Miracle of Rational Persuasion

    Thumbnail
    View / Download
    699.9 Kb
    Date
    2014
    Author
    Martin, Stephen
    Advisor
    Flanagan, Owen
    Repository Usage Stats
    271
    views
    241
    downloads
    Abstract

    My dissertation is about good arguments and why they fail to persuade. Besides being a common experience of everyday life, this is an old worry of Plato's that continues to motivate two contemporary lines of research. The first concerns what makes something a good argument, and the second concerns what a mind must be like to be moved by one. Together, these lines guide my project and divide it into two parts. Part I is about good reasons, specifically epistemic reasons. In my first chapter, I defend epistemic instrumentalism, the position that epistemic reasons are good reasons only relative to one's epistemic preferences. I acknowledge that epistemic instrumentalism opens the door to a terrible proliferation of incompatible preferences, but claim that this is merely a potential problem, and not an actual problem to be solved. In my second chapter, I discuss the nature of reasonhood, and argue, contrary to orthodoxy, that there is no compelling reason to accept the skeptic's claim that, because of the inconsistency of three very basic epistemic preferences, it is impossible for any position to be conclusively safe to hold. Part II is about immovable minds. Immovable minds are minds that are unpersuaded by good reasons. In my third chapter, I argue that for good reasons to be persuasive, the properties that make them good reasons must be identified, through habituation, with other desirable qualities like pleasure or success. Identifying the merits of good reasons with other rewards cultivates intellectual character, and intellectual character, as I argue in my final chapter, remains worth cultivating, notwithstanding situationist doubts about the existence of character and intuitionist concerns about human rationality.

    Type
    Dissertation
    Department
    Philosophy
    Subject
    Philosophy
    argument
    character
    epistemology
    persuasion
    rationality
    skepticism
    Permalink
    https://hdl.handle.net/10161/9397
    Citation
    Martin, Stephen (2014). Irresistible Reasons, Immovable Minds, and the Miracle of Rational Persuasion. Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/9397.
    Collections
    • Duke Dissertations
    More Info
    Show full item record
    Creative Commons License
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

    Rights for Collection: Duke Dissertations

     

     

    Search Scope

    Browse

    All of DukeSpaceCommunities & CollectionsAuthorsTitlesTypesBy Issue DateDepartmentsAffiliations of Duke Author(s)SubjectsBy Submit DateThis CollectionAuthorsTitlesTypesBy Issue DateDepartmentsAffiliations of Duke Author(s)SubjectsBy Submit Date

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics