Optimal industrial targeting with unknown learning-by-doing

dc.contributor.author

Dinopoulos, E

dc.contributor.author

Lewis, TR

dc.contributor.author

Sappington, DEM

dc.date.accessioned

2010-03-09T15:33:51Z

dc.date.issued

1995-05-01

dc.description.abstract

We examine a government's optimal targeting policy when it has limited information about the learning curves of domestic producers. Popular arguments suggest that in order to promote learning-by-doing, the government might want to protect domestic producers from foreign competition by temporarily closing the domestic market to foreign producers. We identify a set of conditions under which such trade intervention is not optimal. Instead, domestic welfare is better fostered either by no government intervention, or by providing subsidies to the most capable domestic producers who are willing to set a particularly low domestic price for their product. © 1995.

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application/pdf

dc.identifier.issn

0022-1996

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https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1956

dc.language.iso

en_US

dc.publisher

Elsevier BV

dc.relation.ispartof

Journal of International Economics

dc.title

Optimal industrial targeting with unknown learning-by-doing

dc.type

Journal article

pubs.begin-page

275

pubs.end-page

295

pubs.issue

3-4

pubs.organisational-group

Duke

pubs.organisational-group

Economics

pubs.organisational-group

Fuqua School of Business

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Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

pubs.publication-status

Published

pubs.volume

38

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