“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

dc.contributor.author

Collard-Wexler, A

dc.contributor.author

Gowrisankaran, G

dc.contributor.author

Lee, RS

dc.date.accessioned

2020-10-14T13:53:51Z

dc.date.available

2020-10-14T13:53:51Z

dc.date.issued

2019-02-01

dc.date.updated

2020-10-14T13:53:51Z

dc.description.abstract

© 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a noncooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends Rubinstein’s alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms’ marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to Nash-in-Nash prices, that is, each pair’s Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/21600

dc.publisher

University of Chicago Press

dc.relation.isversionof

10.1086/700729

dc.subject

C78

dc.subject

D43

dc.subject

L13

dc.title

“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work

dc.type

Scholarly edition

pubs.begin-page

163

pubs.end-page

195

pubs.organisational-group

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

pubs.organisational-group

Economics

pubs.organisational-group

Duke

pubs.publication-status

Published

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
BargainingInBilateralOligopoly_June2017.pdf
Size:
551.85 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format