State Preferences, Viable Alternatives, and Covert Action

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to build a model of when and where the United Statesengaged in covert action during the Cold War. This study introduces novel data onAmerican covert action during the cold war, as well as new data on the presence ofviable alternative (VA) governments throughout the Cold War. It describes thedistribution of both these phenomenon across both space and time, and tests anargument about where the U.S. chose to employ covert action during the Cold War. Thestatistical results show that the U.S. was likely to employ covert regime change againstpotential targets aligned against the U.S.-led order in which there was a viablealternative government for the U.S. to partner with. The U.S. was likely to engage incovert regime maintenance to prop up states aligned with with U.S.-led order in whichthere was a viable alternative government the U.S. desired to keep out of the power.Finally, subversion was most probable against targets who stood against the U.S. order,but in which there was no viable opposition for the U.S. to partner with.