Obedience to the Unenforceable

dc.contributor.advisor

Munger, Michael

dc.contributor.author

Tilley, Cameron

dc.date.accessioned

2025-01-08T17:44:08Z

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2025-01-08T17:44:08Z

dc.date.issued

2024

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Political Science

dc.description.abstract

This essay is a study of norms, the social rules we follow out of our expectations of others. It investigates the intimate relationship between norms and law. That chapter argues each institution has its own domain, and conflict occurs when those domains are violated. The second chapter asks whether there existed a norm of balanced budgeting in the U.S. Congress. Investigating that question required building a theory of norm contestation, which provides a way to test if a norm existed and changed using text analysis. The final chapter addresses the conditions that best foster the spread of norms of volunteering. It demonstrates medium levels of social capital lead to the highest percentage of volunteers while too much social capital can hinder the spread of norms.

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/31880

dc.rights.uri

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

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Political science

dc.title

Obedience to the Unenforceable

dc.type

Dissertation

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