Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information

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Date

2011

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Lopomo, Giuseppe

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the incentive issues and strategic interactions among decentralized parties in three operations management environments: inventory systems, revenue management and healthcare policies. The first model studies the impact of multilateral asymmetric information about inventories in a two-echelon inventory systems. The second model applies optimization techniques to solve a monopolist's revenue problem where the seller's cost function is not separable across buyers with multidimensional private information. The third model uses a game-theoretical approach to study the decentralized resource allocation between self-interested countries to control an epidemic disease.

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Wang, Shouqiang (2011). Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information. Dissertation, Duke University. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/5652.

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