Du Châtelet on the metaphysics and epistemology of time

Abstract

Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics contains important interventions in the eighteenth-century debates over the metaphysics and epistemology time. At the heart of her view, I argue, is an analysis of temporal experience that rests on our ability to represent pluralities of non-coexisting things. The upshot is an account of time that is deeply analogous to her account of space, with important exceptions that pinpoint exactly where time differs from space. The account I offer here includes an interpretation of the ‘external to’ and ‘succession’ relations important for her philosophy of space and time respectively, a denial of any external/internal asymmetry between space and time as found in Locke, a discussion of the place of absolute time in her philosophy, and an investigation of her views on the measurement of time. Though at first sight, Du Châtelet’s philosophy of time bears striking resemblances to different aspects of Leibniz and Locke on time, in fact her view turns out to be highly innovative, both in the questions she seeks to address and in the answers she provides.