Economic Returns to Deputy Status in Authoritarian Legislatures: Evidence from China
| dc.contributor.advisor | Malesky, Edmund J | |
| dc.contributor.author | Liu, Zhen | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-05-12T20:50:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-05-12T20:50:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.department | Political Science | |
| dc.description.abstract | In explaining legislatures in authoritarian regimes, cooptation theory, selectorate theory, and literature on value of political connections and status suggest higher economic returns to legislators. Using survey data concerning Chinese individuals, this paper empirically explores the effect of legislative deputy status on personal income, and does not find the deputies to be better off than non-deputies. The results are qualitatively the same in a series of Heckman two-stage models and Propensity Score Matching methods. However, it might be too early to declare the failure of those theories in China, and this paper calls for cautious interpretation of the result. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.subject | Political science | |
| dc.subject | authoritarian institutions | |
| dc.subject | cooptation theory | |
| dc.subject | economic returns | |
| dc.subject | legislature | |
| dc.subject | value of political connections | |
| dc.title | Economic Returns to Deputy Status in Authoritarian Legislatures: Evidence from China | |
| dc.type | Master's thesis |