On the Possibility of Evil: Freedom, Choice, and Responsibility within the Kantian Moral Framework

Abstract

An oft-criticized aspect of Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy is its perceived incompatibility with moral imputation. Kant proposes an objective moral law, which is tested through the categorical imperative, and distinguishes between two types of will, autonomous and heteronomous. An autonomous will legislates itself using reason, which guides it to incorporate the moral law as its sole maxim, such that an individual with such a will would act morally. Conversely, a heteronomous will is influenced by external factors, such as inclinations, and therefore can be considered unfree; an individual with such a will may act immorally, or even evilly. Thus arises the question: Do freedom and rationality necessarily preclude immoral and evil actions in Kantian moral philosophy, and if so, how can we assign responsibility for evil? While Kant develops his core moral philosophy within his seminal work Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), this thesis chiefly turns to his relatively lesser-known later work, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793), to uncover a more nuanced interpretation of his views on morality and responsibility. Reference is also made to his Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Drawing on selected secondary sources such as Henry E. Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Freedom (1990) and Emil Fackenheim’s Kant and Radical Evil (1954), as well as insights from other philosophers like Leibniz where relevant to Kant, this thesis argues that Kant’s framework not only allows for moral responsibility, but also strengthens its significance.