Sabotage in the Digital Era

Abstract

In the digital era, sabotage is an attractive tool to policymakers looking for strategic utility below the threshold of violence, with little to no interaction with the target nation, and a very low risk of escalation. This project analyzes sabotage policy and operations to provide the Office of Irregular Warfare with insight on "can, should, and how" the Department of Defense might approach sabotage in the digital era. The project utilizes chronological policy analysis to track the evolution of U.S. cyber policy from 2001 to 2021 and examines three case studies, selected from twenty-four possible, using a building block model to identify sub-theories on sabotage. In the analysis process, three characteristics of the digital era's nature of warfare are identified--the threshold of violence, interaction, and escalation. Finally, a sub-theory is presented comprised of intensity, speed, and control that is adapted to Clausewitz's Trinity of Warfare. This new sub-theory provides a novel approach to thinking about sabotage policy formation and operations. Finally, the project revisits the "can, should, and how" framework to provide a succinct summation of findings.