Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Management

Abstract

This paper explores how the possession of nuclear weapons influences the preference of states for crisis management strategies during international conflicts. Although many pre- vious studies have focused on whether nuclear weapons deter the onset of the crisis or shape the outcomes, less attention has been paid to their impact on crisis management decisions once a conflict has begun. Using an ordinal logistic regression model on data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, this study examines whether nuclear-armed states would employ more belligerent or restrained crisis management strategies compared to nonnuclear states. The findings challenge assumptions in classical deterrence theory, showing that nuclear weapons do not significantly affect the behavior of defender states during international crises. The results support the nuclear irrelevance theory, suggesting that nu- clear weapons have no significant impact preference on crisis management strategies. These results contribute to debates in security studies by questioning the strategic utility of nuclear weapons in the conflict decision-making process, and also add implications for arms control and crisis diplomacy.