NATURALIST MORAL THEORY: A REPLY TO STADDON
| dc.contributor.author | Hocutt, Max | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-25T20:42:36Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-03-25T20:42:36Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.description.abstract | ABSTRACT: In an earlier essay in this journal, the estimable John Staddon charges B. F. Skinner and E. O. Wilson with committing several fallacies while promoting evolutionary ethics. The present essay replies that what Staddon regards as fallacies are signal contributions to a naturalistic understanding of ethical choice and language. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.publisher | Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies | |
| dc.subject | naturalistic fallacy, ethical naturalism, pragmatism, evolutionary ethics, genetic fallacy, value | |
| dc.title | NATURALIST MORAL THEORY: A REPLY TO STADDON | |
| dc.type | Journal article |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1