Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System

dc.contributor.author

Kranton, RE

dc.date.accessioned

2010-03-09T15:23:14Z

dc.date.issued

1996-09-01

dc.description.abstract

Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and monetary market exchange. When more people engage in reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase, reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility. Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The results characterize the use of personal "connections" as a system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets.

dc.format.mimetype

application/pdf

dc.identifier.issn

0002-8282

dc.identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/10161/1732

dc.language.iso

en_US

dc.relation.ispartof

American Economic Review

dc.title

Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System

dc.type

Journal article

pubs.begin-page

830

pubs.end-page

851

pubs.issue

4

pubs.organisational-group

Duke

pubs.organisational-group

Duke Population Research Center

pubs.organisational-group

Duke Population Research Institute

pubs.organisational-group

Economics

pubs.organisational-group

Sanford School of Public Policy

pubs.organisational-group

Trinity College of Arts & Sciences

pubs.publication-status

Published

pubs.volume

86

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Kranton_reciprocal_exchange.pdf
Size:
8.66 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format