OMISSIONS, CAUSATION, AND MODALITY
dc.contributor.advisor | Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Bernstein, Sara | |
dc.contributor.author | Henne, Paul | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-07T19:49:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-06-07T19:49:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.department | Philosophy | |
dc.description.abstract | In The Neverending Story (1984), “the nothing” was spreading throughout Fantasia. This is terrifying not just because of the nature of the west-German fantasy film but also because nothing—non-being—was represented as something that existed. Nothing can’t be—or so it seems. In this dissertation, I ask: what do ordinary statements about omissions and absences mean if they are not about things that exist? And then I ask: how can an answer to this question help us understand omissive causation? I present various normative accounts of omissive language and omissive causal models. I end by considering some reasons to doubt such models. | |
dc.identifier.uri | ||
dc.subject | Philosophy | |
dc.subject | Causation | |
dc.subject | Omissions | |
dc.title | OMISSIONS, CAUSATION, AND MODALITY | |
dc.type | Dissertation |