Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

2018-01-01

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Repository Usage Stats

142
views
678
downloads

Citation Stats

Abstract

© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. Gordon Tullock developed an approach to understanding dynamic processes of political change and policy outcomes. The key insight is the notion that political insiders have a comparative advantage—because they face lower transaction costs—in manipulating rules. The result is that political actors can collect revenues from threatening to restrict, or offering to loosen, access to valuable permissions, permits, or services. To the extent that the ability to pay for such favorable treatment is a consequence of private activities that produce greater social value, there is a “political Coase theorem”: corruption makes bad systems more efficient. But the dynamic consequences are extremely negative, because of the inability to institute reforms resulting from application of Tullock’s “transitional gains trap”.

Department

Description

Provenance

Subjects

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9

Publication Info

Munger, MC (2018). Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem”. Public Choice. 10.1007/s11127-018-0610-9 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/17611.

This is constructed from limited available data and may be imprecise. To cite this article, please review & use the official citation provided by the journal.

Scholars@Duke

Munger

Michael C. Munger

Professor of Political Science

Professor of Political Science, and Director of the PPE Certificate Program. His primary research focus is on the functioning of markets, regulation, and government institutions. He has taught at Dartmouth College, University of Texas, and University of North Carolina (where he was Director of the Master of Public Administration Program), as well as working as a staff economist at the Federal Trade Commission during the Reagan Administration.

Munger is a past President of the Public Choice Society, an international academic society of political scientists and economists with members in 16 countries. He was North American Editor of the journal Public Choice for five years, and is now a Co-Editor of The Independent Review. His recent books include Choosing in Groups (2015, Cambridge U Press) and Tomorrow 3.0 (2018, Cambridge U Press). Munger's most recent book, The Sharing Economy, was published in 2021 by the Institute for Economic Affairs.


Unless otherwise indicated, scholarly articles published by Duke faculty members are made available here with a CC-BY-NC (Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial) license, as enabled by the Duke Open Access Policy. If you wish to use the materials in ways not already permitted under CC-BY-NC, please consult the copyright owner. Other materials are made available here through the author’s grant of a non-exclusive license to make their work openly accessible.