Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer
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2014-01-01
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We analyze a simple dynamic durable good model. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition, making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller. A buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller. © (2014) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Anton, JJ, G Biglaiser and N Vettas (2014). Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer. International Economic Review, 55(3). pp. 943–958. 10.1111/iere.12077 Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10161/13112.
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James J. Anton
James J. Anton is the Hanes Corporation Foundation Professor in the Economics Area at the Fuqua School of Business. He also has secondary appointments in the Department of Economics at Duke and at UNC. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University 1984 and, prior to joining the Fuqua faculty in 1989, he served on the faculty at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
Professor Anton's interests are in the area of applied microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics. His research focuses on issues involving information, incentives, contracting, and property rights in markets where strategic rivalry between firms is an important feature. He has published papers on innovation incentives and intellectual property rights, competitive pricing and sourcing, procurement contracts, auctions, incentive regulations, and antitrust issues.
Professor Anton has taught a variety of courses at Fuqua, including managerial economics, economic environment of the firm (macroeconomics), competitive analysis, and a course on global markets and institutions, and he has taught in several degree programs at Fuqua. His teaching has been recognized on past occasions, including the Outstanding Professor Award from the Global Executive Classes of 2003 and of 2001. In 2007, he received the Bank of America Faculty Award.
Professor Anton's research has been published in a variety of economics journals, including The American Economic Review, The International Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies, The RAND Journal of Economics, The Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, The Journal of Public Economics, and The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and also in law and policy journals. He currently serves as an Associate Editor at The RAND Journal of Economics, on the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics, and, previously, as Associate Editor at Management Science and Co-editor of The Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
On the personal side, Professor Anton is married and has two sons. He enjoys music and sports and, despite advancing years, continues to try to play volleyball.
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