“Giving” in to social pressure
| dc.contributor.author | Name-Correa, AJ | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yildirim, H | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-06T00:01:01Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-09-01 | |
| dc.description.abstract | © 2016 Elsevier Inc.We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a social norm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism givers fare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donor welfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision of the public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a light-handed regulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption from the popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show that contrary to pure altruism, a more equal income distribution may produce more of the public good. In fundraising campaigns where a social norm is not apparent, one may emerge endogenously if donors are not too heterogeneous. | |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1090-2473 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | ||
| dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.006 | |
| dc.title | “Giving” in to social pressure | |
| dc.type | Journal article | |
| pubs.begin-page | 99 | |
| pubs.end-page | 116 | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Duke | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Economics | |
| pubs.organisational-group | Trinity College of Arts & Sciences | |
| pubs.publication-status | Published | |
| pubs.volume | 99 |